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FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROTECTION:
THE ARBITRATION ASPECT
EARL SNYDER*
Sir George Jessel-not the American entertainer raised to
spurious Hollywood knighthood, but the erudite, quick-witted
19th century English Master of the Rolls-once said, "I may be
wrong and sometimes am, but I never have any doubts."
It is unfortunately difficult not to have doubts about the most
effective way of encouraging and protecting foreign investment
in newly developing nations in Latin America, Asia and Africa.
The relatively new Act for International Development1 makes
it part of United States foreign policy to encourage private
investment in these nations.
There is substantial agreement, however, that one of the de-
terrents to a greater flow of private investment capital to newly
developing nations is the considerable non-business risk in-
volved. This risk (in some, not all, newly developing nations)
stems from (1) "creeping" or outright expropriation of prop-
erty without adequate, prompt and effective compensation; (2)
currency controls and inconvertibility; (3) export and import
controls; and (4) political and social instability.
There have been several suggestions for minimizing this risk.
One suggestion is termed unilateral. This requires assurances
(constitutional provisions, legislative enactments, executive pol-
icy statements) by newly developing nations that private for-
eign capital will be permitted to develop safe from confiscation
and harassment within the legal, political and economic frame-
work of the country in which the investment is made. Invest-
ment insurance or guarantees by the government of the private
investor, such as the United States investment guarantee pro-
gram, also are included in this concept.
A second suggestion uses a bilateral approach. It includes any
agreement between two nations affording an opportunity for
and protection of private foreign investment. For example, the
numerous bilateral treaties of "friendship, commerce and navi-
gation" the United States has concluded with other nations fall
within this concept. In addition, if an investment insurance
* Member, District of Columbia bar; Barrister-at-Law, Gray's Inn, London;
Member, Committee on International Trade and Investment, American Bar
Association.
1. 75 Stat. 438 (1961), 22 U.S.C.A. 2351 (a) (1961 Supp.).
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or guarantee program is shared in a treaty between a capital
exporting and a capital importing nation, the approach is
bilateral.
A third suggestion visualizes a multilateral approach. It en-
compasses either (1) an investment insurance or guarantee
program; or (2) an agreement or code or convention among a
group of capital exporting and importing nations (ideally the
program or agreement would be worldwide) to facilitate the
flow of private investment capital from nations having it to
nations needing it.
Some work has been done in both these directions. For ex-
ample, in March, 1962, The World Bank completed a study on
the feasibility of a multilateral insurance program.2 The bank
does not at present contemplate further action, however, in the
belief that its function is that of an impartial banking-lending
agency, not an initiator or promoter of a somewhat controver-
sial world-wide investment insurance program. Several organ-
izations-among them the International Chamber of Commerce
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment-have drafted proposed multilateral conventions for en-
couraging and protecting foreign investment. Although they
have generally been acceptable to capital exporting nations,
newly developing nations have not shown great interest in be-
coming signatories to them.
Each of the three basic approaches, unilateral, bilateral, and
multilateral, has advantages and disadvantages; each, of course,
has its supporters and detractors. But underlying them all is the
mordant fact that no matter what means are used to facilitate
movement of private investment capital to newly developing
nations, there will be disputes and controversies between in-
vestors and nations in which investments are made. Any other
view is simply a pathological belief in the occurrence of the
impossible.
A way must be found to resolve these disputes before they
escalate into acrimonious proportions discouraging further de-
sirable private investment in nations desperately needing it.
One suggestion for doing this is international arbitration of
foreign investor-newly developing nation disputes. Moreover,
it has been suggested that the arbitration procedure be institu-
tionalized in an international convention or conventions. This
2. Multilateral Investment Insurance, A Staff Report, Int'l Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, Washington, D. C. (March 1962).
19641
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should give greater opportunity for widespread acceptance and
use of arbitration, something that ad hoc arbitration has not
had in the past.
At first impression, arbitration of foreign investment dis-
putes may seem a far-fetched means of encouraging and protect-
ing private investment. But will not fair and expeditious settle-
ment of foreign investment disputes strongly encourage nations
in which investments are made to be considerate and thoughtful
in their treatment of these investments? Is not this also one of
the factors that might encourage responsible private investors
to move capital to newly developing nations?3
Why Arbltration?
There is, of course, the possibility that foreign investment
disputes might be resolved by diplomacy, mediation or concilia-
tion. Diplomacy has not, however, proven to be effective. Na-
tions are reluctant to espouse claims of their national investors
against newly developing nations. Political considerations are
often overweighing. Mediation and conciliation are potentially
useful. But where vital economic interests of investors and na-
tions are at stake, it is difficult to mark out an area of accept-
able, voluntary compromise. (Mediation and conciliation can
be used where this is possible, however.)
For obvious reasons, a foreign investor is reluctant to allow
adjustment of his grievance before a tribunal of a nation al-
legedly causing a grievance, or in which a grievance arises. As
long ago as 1938, at the biennial International Law Association
conference in Amsterdam, one international jurist noted: "The
indispensable objectivity and impartiality [of national courts]
are sometimes jeopardized by consideration of national inter-
3. For a generally affirmative answer see U.N. Doc. No. E/3492, The Pro-
motion of the Int'l Flow of Private Capital (18 May 1961) p. 100: ". . . In
effect, the consultations carried out in the course of the preparation of this
Report tend toward the conclusion that apprehension of non-business risks con-
stitutes an impediment to foreign private investment which may be substantially
lessened by the assurance of an effective machinery for the adjustment of
investors' claims arising from disputes with the government of the country of
investment. In order to be effective, such machinery should be international
in character, so as to assure complete independence in interest from both parties
to the dispute. . . ." To the same effect, U.N. Doc. No. E/3365, The Promotion
of the Int'l Flow of Capital (28 June 1962) p. 41. In the limited context of oil
investment in the Middle East see Levy, Issues in International Oil Policy, 35
FoREIGN AFFAIRS 454, 468 (1957): ". . . It is becoming imperative that we
insist more energetically . . . that disputes be arbitrated rather than unilaterally
resolved in favor of Middle East governments under the threat of expropria-
tion. .. ."
['Vol. 16
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ests; this occurs especially in cases in which considerable
interests are at stake."
4
The plain fact is that no international tribunal or system of
international tribunals exists by which these disputes may be
decided. Only international organizations and nations may be
litigants before the International Court of Justice at the
Hague. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, which also has its
seat at the Hague, now permits its staff and premises to be used
for arbitration of disputes between a nation and a private cor-
poration, providing the nation involved is a signatory of the
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes of 1899 or 1907.5
This is helpful, of course, but it does not provide an arbitral
tribunal to resolve foreign investment disputes; it simply pro-
vides premises and staff. Moreover, the nation must be a sig-
natory of one of the conventions mentioned. Most newly devel-
oping nations are not signatories of either convention.
What is needed, as the then Attorney General, Herbert
Brownell, said at the American Bar Association convention in
London, July 24, 1957, is ". . . a tribunal or system of tribunals
which will command general confidence as to the fairness of
their judgment and whose procedure will be supported by a
public opinion which will not tolerate a departure from them."
Contrary to popular belief, this idea is neither new nor revo-
lutionary."
Arbitration has been defined as "the voluntary submission
of a dispute by the interested parties to a disinterested person
or persons for final determination."17 It has advantages over
judicial settlement of disputes as well as settlement by diplo-
macy, mediation and conciliation. Its flexibility, imprimatur of
impartiality and speed, when properly conducted, seem unob-
tainable by overburdened national courts. It is not so cumber-
some as judicial settlement of disputes. It adheres to basic
principles of law while preserving the flexibility of rational
standards of commercial fairness. It is concerned more with
common sense and justice and less with political nuances than
4. INTL' L. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE FORTIETH CONFERENCE 174-75.
5. Circular Note of the Secretary-General, Permanent Court of Arbitration
(March 3, 1960). An unofficial translation of this note appears in 54 Am. J.
INT'L L. 933 (1960).
6. See, e.g., the history of this idea in SOHN, PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISH-
MENT OF A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL TPiBuNALs IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ARBITRATION 63 (Domke ed. 1958).
7. Am. ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RuLEs 3 (1954).
1961]
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diplomacy, mediation or conciliation. It allows an individual
or business entity to act as litigant.
True, there is little past experience or precedent in the settle-
ment of foreign investment disputes by international arbitration.
On balance, this may be an advantage. It permits room in which
to move forward into new areas that appear to be workable and
practicable without offending stare decisis. It allows oppor-
tunity for regional institutional arbitration with permanent
administrative machinery. It permits adoption of a new, more
generally acceptable basis for awards. It allows establishment
of ad hoc tribunals composed of arbitrators of different na-
tionalities chosen from among respected, competent, knowledge-
able jurists and businessmen. It permits establishment of an
appellate arbitral tribunal to aid in maintaining reasonable uni-
formity of legal bases of awards.
Vhy RegionaZ Arbitration?
Most lawyers will agree that it is unreasonable to expect a
litigant in San Francisco, for example, to be required to go all
the way to Washington, D. C. to litigate an action against the
United States. Is it not equally unreasonable to expect a litigant
in, say, Lima, Peru, Lagos, Nigeria, Aukland, New Zealand or
New York City to go all the way to the Hague, London or
Colombo, Ceylon, to litigate an action against a nation which
he asserts is derelict with respect to his investment?
Moreover, is not one worldwide arbitral tribunal too large
and unwieldy if it is to be, as it must, if worldwide, representa-
tive of all capital exporting and importing nations and large
enough to handle the expected volune of worldwide business?
Are sensitive, sovereign, newly developing nations amenable
to one tribunal physically distant and located in a capital ex-
porting nation? Are investors in capital exporting nations
amenable to one tribunal physically distant and located in a
newly developing nation?
A reasonable solution seems to lie in the establishment of a
system of regional arbitral tribunals. A somewhat analogous
suggestion was made as long ago as 1924 by members of the
Hungarian branch of the International Law Association; this
occurred at the 33rd conference of the Association. The sugges-
tion, in slightly different form, was renewed by members of the
[Vol. 16
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French branch in 1934 at the 38th conference of the Asso-
ciation."
Selecting the regions is a difficult task. Insofar as possible,
they should follow geographic and ethnic lines. On this bases
the noncommunist world might be divided into seven regions:
(1) Turkey, Iran, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, United Arab
Republic, Iraq, Saudi Arabia; (2) remainder of Africa; (3)
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, India, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand,
Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, Malaya, Indonesia, Philippines,
Taiwan, Japan; (4) Australia, New Zealand, and the rest of
Australasia; (5) Europe, Great Britain, Ireland, Israel; (6)
South and Central America (excluding Mexico); (7) North
American continent (including Mexico).
Some of these regions may be cumbersome and unworkable.
Others may be neither ethnically similar nor geographically con-
tiguous. To a degree, this may be inevitable. But the selection is
not intended to be inflexible. If further reflection and experience
indicate that other regional groupings are more desirable, those
should prevail.
The important points are to (1) form reasonably compatible
groups of states following geographic and ethnic lines where
feasible; (2) form groups of states with at least a modicum of
economic, political and cultural ties; and (3) give a component
state a feeling of basic confidence in the fairness with which its
disputes will be approached.
Arbitration Process
Selection of arbitrators is extremely important. It is common-
place to say that they should be highly competent, mature,
knowledgeable, respected and impartial-but it is nonetheless
urgently true.
A three-man tribunal in which each of two party-litigants
chooses an arbitrator and the two arbitrators choose a presiding
8. The Hungarian suggestion in 1924 was for "an International Tribunal for
civil matters competent for litigous civil matters between a private individual
and a foreign State or between private individuals having their domicile in
different States. The French conception [in 1934] advocates the creation of a
mixed tribunal set up always by two States only and competent for differences
between those two States or between one State and a subject of the other or
between subjects of the respective States. Professor de La Pradelle has a
regional solution in view. No doubt it is easier to create regional organizations
than universal ones." (Emphasis added) INT'L L. Ass'WN REPORT OF THE 38TH
CONFERENcE 79 (1934). Compare Inter-Parliamentary Union Doc. No. C/EF/
58/5 (Ext.) 4 (1958).
1964]
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arbitrator, should be adequate. The presiding arbitrator must not
be a national of, nor the same nationality as, a party-litigant.
(If there is more than one party-litigant on each side, then all
litigants on one side choose one arbitrator and all on the other
side choose another.)
It has been suggested that the two arbitrators be businessmen
of judicial temperament who are knowledgeable in foreign com-
mercial matters, including foreign investment. The presiding
arbitrator should be an international jurist with recognized.
competence in foreign commercial matters, including foreign
investment. A five-man tribunal might be desirable in infrequent
instances; but it is arguable whether its desirability warrants the
extra expense, on balance.
It is necessary to assure that a recalcitrant litigant to a foreign
investment dispute not be allowed to prevent arbitration by re-
fusal to appoint an arbitrator. This has happened in the past; it
emasculates the arbitral process. This can be effectively accom-
plished by a carefully drawn provision in the convention estab-
lishing the arbitration tribunal. The provision, for example,
could provide for appointment of the arbitrator by an impartial,
disinterested, distinguished person of a nationality different
fTom that of any party to the dispute.9
The rules of procedure of the arbitral process must be fair,
equitable and well-defined. If litigants fail to receive a full and
fair hearing and have their dispute equitably and impartially
decided on its merits, arbitration becomes a mockery. There may
be no effective, impartial method of settling foreign investment
disputes.
Bases for Awards
Awards of arbitral tribunals in foreign investment disputes
must be based on fundamental legal principles. If a party to the
arbitration alleges a breach of either public or private interna-
tional law, the issues must be decided on the basis of principles
of the law involved.
There are two points one should bear in mind, however. One
is that principles of public (and to a lesser extent, private) inter-
national law are indistinct in some areas and nonexistent in
others. The second is that newly developing nations are reluctant
9. The writer has done this in a proposed arbitration convention he has
drafted. See Snyder, Foreign Investment Protection: A Proposed Arbitration
Convention, 11 J. PuB. L. 191, 203 (1963).
[Vol. 16
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to subscribe to an arbitral process basing awards solely on inter-
national law, either public or private. Many newly developing
nations assert, perhaps wrongly, they had no part in shaping this
international law.'0
One cannot, however, escape the necessity for adhering to such
widely accepted international law principles as pacta sunt ser-
vanda. In this context, then, and with reliance on fundamental
principles of public and private international law, awards may
be based on (1) tenets agreed upon by the parties; or (2) in the
absence of agreement, ex aequo et bono. A tribunal basing an
award ex aeguo et bono should be guided by: (1) trade customs;
(2) private international law rules; and (3) principles of justice
recognized by the principal legal systems of the world.
Enforcement of Awards
There is neither effective world legal order nor properly con-
stituted force to implement that order if it existed. Attitudes of
national courts toward enforcement of arbitral awards vary from
country to country. For these reasons, enforcement may be diffi-
cult, tortuous and time-consuming at best; at worst, it is non-
existent. But if international arbitration of foreign investment
disputes is to gain widespread acceptance, it is obvious that there
must be effective enforcement of awards.
One of two approaches may be feasible: First, it may be pos-
sible to incorporate the so-called New York Convention on Rec-
10. See, e.g., Anand, Role of the New Asian-African Countries in the Present
International Legal Order, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 383, 384-90 (1962) ; Brierly, THE
LAW OF NATIONS, 42 (4th ed. 1949) : "The law of nations had its origin among
a few kindred nations of western Europe .... "; remarks of Dr. Jorge Casta-
neda, legal adviser, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the U.N. at Am. Soc. Int'l
L., New York Regional Meeting, March 2, 1961, pp. 11-12: "There is another
interesting aspect of this problem. . . . Most under-developed countries would
rather tend to feel, I think, that the concept of the minimum standard was
created by the practice of the highly industrialized nations in the past in their
relations with the under-developed countries, in situations of great inequality,
especially in the last century and the beginning of this century. . . ."; Porter,
Multilateral Protection of Foreign Investment, 3 INT'L DEVELOPMENT R-v. 23,
26 (1961) : "A widely held view was expressed by the Mexican representative,
Senor Castaneda: nearly half of the nations represented in the United Nations
have come into being since the main body of international law was formulated;
they question their obligation to be bound by rules which they had not helped
to create. . . ."; compare, Domke, Foreign Nationalization, 55 Am. J. INT'L L.
585 (1961): ". . . International law, far from being an outgrowth of only
Western concepts, is indeed an expression of fundamental principles embodied
in long established legal systems throughout the world. Islamic law, for instance
which is of real significance for one sixth of the world population, in the Middle
East, Pakistan, Southeast Asia and parts of Africa, clearly embodies the uni-
versal maxim of the protection of acquired rights. .. ".
1964]
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ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards" into the
convention establishing regional arbitral tribunals. Or second, it
may be acceptable to incorporate specific enforcement provisions
into the convention establishing regional arbitral tribunals.
Should There be an Appellate Tribunal?
There has never been an international appellate arbitral tri-
bunal. This is no reason why there should not be one now, how-
ever. There are three reasons why one seems desirable: (1) to
correct errors of regional arbitral tribunals; (2) to aid in estab-
lishing a more uniform "arbitral jurisprudence"; and (3) to
fulfill the pragmatic, eminently necessary function of allowing
an unsuccessful party an opportunity to work off the head of
steam his unsuccessful quest engendered.
There should be a right of appeal in certain instances. In all
other instances, an unsuccessful party should have a privilege
of appeal. This privilege might be elevated into an appeal in the
discretion of either (1) the tribunal which made the original
award; (2) the appellate tribunal; or (3) an impartial legal
agency connected in some manner with the appellate tribunal.
Moreover, a procedure allowing decision on a question of law
certified to the appellate tribunal by a regional arbitral tribunal
should exist. This would be analogous to the presently available
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, except
that it would be binding.
The procedural system for lodging and perfecting appeals
should not be difficult to establish. It need only work reasonably
well and not be cumbersome. It could be the system of appeal
used in non-criminal cases in any mature juridical system. Per-
haps it might be modeled on the system by which appeal lies in
non-criminal cases to: (1) the United States Supreme Court;
(2) the House of Lords in Great Britain; or (3) the Cour de
Cassation in France or Belgium. It is necessary, of course, that
the system be one upon which states concerned can agree.
Objections to These Proposals
Doubtless there are objections to some or all of these proposals.
One is that they are "visionary." True, but one might answer
11. This convention is set out in Int'l Commercial Arbitration and the Con-
vention of New York, A Study of the Int'l Headquarters of the Int'l Chamber
of Commerce, 11 (1960). Defects in this convention, however, have been pointed
out in Quigley, Accession by the U.S. to the U.N. Convention on the Recogni-
ton and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L. J. 1049 (1961).
These should be explored carefully before verbatim incorporation is sanctioned.
[Vol. 16
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that trite objection by an equally trite retort: these are "vision-
ary" times. Another is that they are expensive. True, but expense
is a relative term. They may not be "expensive" compared to the
losses that may be incurred by investors due to precipitant action,
sometimes gleefully taken at the expense of "former colonial
powers" and their allies, by sensitive, volatile newly developing
nations in a headlong dash to industrialize and raise standards
of living.
Still another revolves around the background or profession of
the arbitrators. Some say that arbitrators should be jurists, not
businessmen; others say they should be businessmen, not jurists.
It is suggested that the best solution, not simply a compromise,
but the best solution for several reasons, is that they be both
businessmen and jurists, with special competence and "judicial
temperament."
Another objection is that arbitrators should not be chosen from
among any persons the parties desire but from a preconstituted
panel. It is suggested that at least in the initial stage of inter-
national arbitration of foreign investment disputes, each party-
litigant will prefer to name an arbitrator without having to
select him from a preconstituted panel. Moreover, for reasons
that are obvious, selection from a preconstituted panel might
not be practicable in the case of regional tribunals. Later, if
experience and desire indicate the feasibility of another method
of selection of arbitrators, that method can be adopted.
A fifth objection is the supposed difficulty in determining
which regional tribunal would have jurisdiction of a particular
dispute; for example, a claim of a foreign investor in the United
States against, say, Pakistan over an investment in Pakistan.
It is possible for either the regional tribunal including the
United States or the one including Pakistan to have jurisdiction.
As a matter of policy it might be preferable to require the claim-
ant (United States investor) to assert his claim in the regional
tribunal of the respondent (Pakistan). If the situation were the
other way around, that is, the government of Pakistan were
asserting a claim against a United States investor, the claim
would be asserted in the regional tribunal including the United
States.
But this is a matter which need not be troublesome. If it seems
preferable to decide jurisdiction in a manner contrary to that
suggested, there does not seem to be an ovreweighing reason why
this could not be done.
1961]
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Another objection is that an appellate tribunal would only
delay the final result. Is not this same objection equally valid in
the juridical hierarchy of the United States? Why have appellate
courts? Why a United States Supreme Court and a final court
of appeal in each of the fifty states? Do they not delay the final
result?
Taken as a whole, these objections remind one of the epigram
attributed to Lord Denning (an English Law Lord); some law-
yers find difficulties for every solution; other lawyers find
solutions for every difficulty. The truth is that if there is suffi-
cient desire on the part of foreign investors and nations to solve
their disputes by arbitration, difficulties can be overcome.
In any event, international arbitration of foreign investor-
newly developing nation disputes is only one part of a possible
program for encouraging and protecting a greater flow of pri-
vate investment capital to newly developing nations. The pro-
posals here may serve as a basis for discussion; they are not
intended to be inflexible nor to provide final answers.
CONCLUSION
How can regional tribunals for resolution of foreign invest-
ment disputes be established? One possibility is for the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations to suggest a meeting of
nations to consider drafting a convention to establish one re-
gional tribunal. The region chosen might be one where a consid-
erable amount of foreign investment is currently going. This
might serve as a basis for testing the feasibility of the proposals.
The Secretary-General might be persuaded to offer his "good
offices" in selecting a site for the meeting, making necessary
arrangements and providing personnel necessary to conduct it.
If this is possible, its implementation requires only the will of
the nations of the region chosen and foreign investors investing
in those nations. If investors make known, with sufficient vigor,
their desire to try this approach, industrially developed nations
will almost certainly be willing to try it. A start may be made.
This start may serve as the motivating force for nations and
foreign investors in other regions to try it.
This is a possibility. Is it not a possibility worth exploring?
[Vol. 16
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